An article by Temur Umarov posted on Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s website notes that Moscow had every opportunity to make the Central Asian nations gravitate toward it of their own accord.  The author notes that yet now Russian soft power in Central Asia is dissipating.

Just one year ago, Russia’s positions in Central Asia were so solid that even China’s growing presence in the region was not a threat.  That all reportedly changed with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  With every missile it fires at Ukrainian cities, the Kremlin is destroying Russia’s influence around the world, above all in the post-Soviet space, according to the article.

Now any statements or gestures that deviate from Moscow’s line look like an attempt by Central Asian countries to sever ties with Russia, and prompt talk of the impending end of its influence in the region. 

None of Central Asia’s nations have supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and all are adhering to Western sanctions against Russia.  The region’s banks do not accept Russian MIR payment cards, for example, and only Kazakhstan allows their use by private individuals—and only after getting U.S. approval to do so.  Not one of the countries in Central Asia has recognized the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics—or other Ukrainian territory that Russia claims to have annexed—as part of Russia.

The article notes that the region is also distancing itself from Russian integration projects. 

Such a behavior is hardly new for the Central Asian nations.  None of them recognized Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and back in 2008, Russia’s then president Dmitry Medvedev tried and failed to garner support from Central Asia for Russia’s war against Georgia.

The author says that for Central Asia, adhering to sanctions isn’t about supporting the West or going against Russia; it’s an attempt to save their economies from collapse and isolation.  A multi-vector foreign policy is an essential condition of the countries’ basic economic prosperity—especially since Russia has shown no sign of being ready to compensate the region for losses it would incur from breaking off relations with the West. Indeed, this is largely why the Kremlin itself does not require Central Asian leaders to show solidarity with it.

From time to time, Moscow reportedly reminds Central Asia of its dependency on Russia, such as by putting a halt to the operations of the Caspian oil pipeline that runs through Russian territory, and which Kazakhstan uses to export 80 percent of its oil.  But Moscow does not demand unswerving allegiance, otherwise the pressure being applied would be far, far greater.  In any case, it can hardly afford to lose its few remaining allies.  The war and the Kremlin’s shrinking opportunities to choose its foreign partners have forced the Kremlin to put higher value on its ties to the Central Asian countries.

As a result, Russia’s trade turnover with all five nations is reportedly growing fast: by 10 percent with Kazakhstan over the first ten months of this year, 40 percent with Uzbekistan over the first nine months, more than 22 percent with Tajikistan over the first eight months, 40 percent with Kyrgyzstan over the first six months, and 45 percent with Turkmenistan just over the first quarter of 2022.  In the second quarter of 2022, more people from Central Asia went to Russia to work than at any time in the last six years, and remittances from Russia have increased accordingly.

The author notes that this growth is clearly largely linked to new trade patterns caused by sanctions, as well as to the mass exodus of Russians who fled to Central Asia following the outbreak of war and the start of mobilization.  At the same time, Moscow is now paying noticeably more attention to the region. This year was the first for many in which Putin visited all five Central Asian nations. In total, he held more than fifty meetings (both online and in person) with Central Asian leaders in 2022.  Many other senior Russian officials and businessmen have also visited the region since the start of the war. Moscow doesn’t just want to show that attempts to isolate Russia have failed: there are also many practical issues to discuss. Central Asia has more to offer than periodic support during UN votes.

Tajikistan, for example, has been accused of providing Russia with deadly Iranian attack drones that have been used in Ukraine (though Dushanbe denies this).  There are reports that Wagner, a Russian private military company, is recruiting convicts from prisons in Turkmenistan to send to Ukraine. Deliveries of telescopic sights from Kyrgyzstan to Russia have increased sevenfold, while the growth in imports of home appliances from the EU to Kazakhstan is reportedly due to the microchips from those goods being used in the Russian military complex.

Russia, in turn, is reportedly getting drawn deeper into local internal politics. It has finally declared the opposition Islamic Renaissance Party in Tajikistan (IRPT) a terrorist organization, after several years of the Tajik leadership asking it to do so.  Russia has also started actively detaining and deporting activists and former politicians at the request of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.  Even Russian passport holders are not safe.

From all of this, it is quite clear that Russia’s influence continues to pervade many aspects of life in Central Asia, and shows no signs of going anywhere any time soon—though the long-term future is far less clear.